This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank-and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of "leveling the playing field" between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.
Introduction
Academics, policymakers and others have debated the costs and benefits of explicit deposit insurance for almost two centuries, going back to the early 1800s when several states in the U.S. adopted various deposit insurance schemes to protect their state banking systems (Calomiris, 1994) and continuing through 1933, when the U.S. became the first country to provide such insurance on a national basis, until today. On the one hand, explicit deposit insurance reduces the likelihood and severity of bank runs during a financial crisis; on the other hand, explicit deposit insurance may increase the likelihood of financial crisis.
Indeed, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide evidence that explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of banking crises, especially when institutions are weak and interest rates are deregulated. However, they do not address potentially positive effects of deposit insurance; they conclude that an interesting question for future research is "whether there are reasons to adopt explicit deposit insurance despite its negative impact on systemic stability," such as "that it may create a basis for a more developed banking system that performs more financial intermediation."
In this study, we provide new evidence that, at least in part, provides an answer to this question. More specifically, we examine how bankers and depositors responded to the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system in 2004 as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question we address is whether or not deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon state-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits.
We also test for potential negative effects of deposit insurance in the form of increased risk-taking. We examine changes in financial risk, as measured by the ratio of bank capital to assets, and changes in operating risk, as measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets.
The Russian experiment is an ideal laboratory for this research. Prior to 2004, there was no system of deposit insurance in Russia, and there were three banking crises during the previous 16 years-in 1992, 1995, and 1998 -when retail depositors suffered substantial losses. This led retail depositors to either rely upon State-owned banks that were explicitly protected by the government guarantees or to keep their savings "under their mattresses." In addition, there are more than 1,000 banks in Russia, and these banks entered into the new deposit insurance system one-by-one at different points in time rather than all at once.
In order to conduct this experiment, we assemble a unique new dataset on the Russian banking industry from a variety of publicly available Russian-language sources. Using these data, we contribute to the literature on deposit insurance in at least two key areas.
First, we provide new evidence on the issue of whether or not a system of explicit deposit insurance leads to increased financial intermediation in the form of higher levels of deposits. Our results provide strong evidence that financial intermediation as measured by the level of deposits does increase following implementation of a deposit insurance system. Second, we provide new evidence on the issue of whether or not deposit insurance leads to reduced reliance upon State-owned banks. This second issue is at least as important as the first, as La Porta et al. (2002) demonstrate: government ownership of banks around the world is pervasive and has negative consequences for financial development and economic growth. King and Levine (1993) and numerous others have demonstrated the importance of financial development for economic growth. (See Levine (2004) for a recent survey.) We find that reliance upon State-owned banks as a repository for deposits does decrease following implementation of an explicit deposit-insurance system, but that this result is driven by the one dominant Stateowned bank, Sberbank, which may have reduced its reliance upon retail deposits in response to the cost of the new deposit insurance premiums. Even so, this result suggests that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system had the effect of "leveling the playing field" between State-owned and privately owned banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a very brief review of the literature on deposit insurance, highlighting papers that are most relevant to the research questions we address. In section 3, we provide background information on the implementation of deposit insurance in Russia. In section 4, we describe our unique dataset on Russian banks. In section 5, we present our methodology for testing our hypotheses regarding the effects of deposit insurance implementation on the Russian banking system. Our results appear in section 6, and we close with a summary and conclusions in section 7.
Literature on the costs and benefits of deposit insurance
There are a number of theoretical papers that explore the cost and benefits of a deposit insurance system; these are summarized by Kane (1995 Kane ( , 2000 . 1 In a seminal article by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , a system of deposit insurance ensures bank stability threatened by depositor runs. However, researchers universally accept that deposit insurance creates moral hazard, as banks can fund high-risk assets that are not reflected in their liability costs (deposit rates). The U.S. S&L and commercial banking crises during the 1980s and 1990s well demonstrated the costs of such moral hazard, as regulators spent hundreds of billions in dollars to sell or liquidate insolvent financial institutions.
An even wider literature empirically analyzes the costs of deposit insurance. Most of these studies analyze data at the country-level rather than at the bank level. In general, these studies find that moral hazard is a greater problem in countries with explicit deposit insurance, leading to a greater likelihood of banking crises. Mondschean and Opiela (1999) examine the impact of changes in deposit insurance on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. They find that, after a new law increased depositinsurance coverage, bank-specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. They interpret this as evidence of decreased market discipline following the increase in deposit-insurance coverage.
Laeven (2002) 
Background on the Russian experiment in deposit insurance
In 1934, the U.S. became the first country to implement a system of deposit insurance, In August 2006, the Assembly increased the coverage limit to RUB190,000, which equals approximately 130 percent of 2006 per capita GDP. This newly adopted amendment also introduced co-insurance, as the amounts above RUB100,000 are reimbursed at only a 90 percent rate. The Assembly introduced the coinsurance mechanism to provide incentives for large depositors to monitor their banks. In subsequent years, the Assembly has gradually increased the coverage limit further-to RUB400,000 in March 2007 and to RUB700,000 in October 2008.
The October 2008 law amendments have also abolished the coinsurance for the amounts in excess of RUB100,000 and established full coverage up to RUB700,000.
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One of the primary goals of deposit-insurance implementation was to draw out the estimated USD40 billion in cash savings held by Russian citizens "under their mattresses" and outside of the banking system, which then could be used by banks as the basis for new loans.
Specifically, the Law on Deposit Insurance defined three closely related goals: (i) the protection of depositors' funds, (ii) the increase in the depositors' confidence in the Russian banking system and (iii) the attraction of household savings in the Russian banking system. These goals arose out of historical experience of Russian depositors, who had been victimized by the losses suffered during the banking crises of 1992, 1995, and 1998, which collectively led to a loss of confidence in privately owned banks.
There is also another institutional characteristic of the Russian deposit market that increases the banking system's vulnerability and the importance of the deposit insurance system in preventing bank runs. By law, all retail deposits in Russia, including term deposits, are revocable. Any deposit can be withdrawn by its owner at any time (Civil Code Article 837).
Thus, all deposits in Russia are essentially demand deposits.
Prior to the new legislation, the Russian government had explicitly stated that it would cover depositor losses only at State-controlled banks 6 , the largest of which was Sberbank. The process for banks' entry into the deposit-insurance system involved several stages and included rigorous on-site examinations. Each bank had to apply for deposit-insurance coverage and then was subject to a special examination before coverage would be granted. 
Data
We use bank-level balance-sheet data to provide new evidence regarding how bankers and depositors respond to the introduction of deposit insurance. As shown in Figure 1 ).
There is no comprehensive and publicly available source of data on the financial statements of Russian banks. However, we are able to construct a unique and representative dataset of Russian banks by combining information from three reliable local sources, none of which are available in English.
The first of these sources is a set of financial reports published online by the CBR itself. Our third source is a publicly available registry of all insured banks maintained by the DIA. 10 From this source, we obtain information on the date of each banks' entry into the depositinsurance system.
We are able to accurately match-merge information from these three data sources by using a unique license registration number assigned to each bank by the CBR. Each of the three data sources uses this registration number as a means of identifying individual banks. We provide a description of each variable and data source in Appendix 2. percent, respectively. The median ratio of equity to assets dropped from 18 percent to 14 percent, primarily because of the increase in assets rather than a decline in equity. The mean (median) ratio of loans to assets increases from 41 (42) percent to 47 (49) percent during the sample period, with a relatively stable standard deviation of about 18 percent.
In Panel B of Table 2 Table 2 also reports the distribution of sample banks by the stages of DIS acceptance. About 75 percent of sample banks were accepted in the first stage, 10 percent were accepted in the second or third stages (after the initial rejection in the first stage), and the remaining 15 percent had not been accepted into the DIS by the end of its introduction.
Methodology
According to Allen and Santomero (1997) , financial intermediation occurs when institutions take deposits and channel funds to firms, in other words, when they issue deposits and use these funds to make loans. Consequently, we focus on measures of deposit-taking and loan-issuance. We track the deposits of privately held and State-owned Russian banks during the period before and after passage and implementation of deposit insurance in order to test the following three hypotheses:
H1: The level of deposits and ratio of deposits to assets will increase with the number of days that a bank has been entered into the DIS, which differs for each bank.
H2: The market share of deposits at State-owned banks will decrease in response to the new explicit deposit-insurance coverage at privately-owned banks.
H3: Operating risk (as measured by the ratio of loans to assets) and financial risk (as measured by the ratio of equity to assets) will increase in response to implementation of the DIS as a result of moral hazard. 11
To test these hypotheses, we employ information on total deposits and total assets, along with information on ownership sufficient to categorize privately held and State-controlled banks.
We perform univariate tests to determine whether total deposits have increased and whether the market share of State-owned banks has decreased. We also perform these tests in a multivariate framework using the following form:
where:
Y i, t is the natural logarithm of retail deposits at bank i, the ratio of retail deposits to total assets at bank i, the ratio of equity to assets at bank i, or the ratio of loans to assets at assets) and Leverage (as measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets); and a series of 34 time fixed-effects dummies for each month in our sample; and i, t is a random-effects error term for bank i in period t.
We also interact some of the control variables with our deposit-insurance variable.
Our panel dataset enables us to account for the multiple stages of the DI implementation in Russia and for the fact that the change in the deposit-insurance regime occurred at a different time for each bank. The beta coefficients indicate the percentage changes in deposits for a one unit change in the explanatory variables. According to our hypotheses, we expect ( 2 > 0) and ( 3 < 0) for both dependent variables.
A broad set of financial and non-financial control variables allow us to identify which banks in the heterogeneous Russian banking industry benefit most from the introduction of the -16 -deposit-insurance system. The bank-level variables include size, capital ratio, location, legal form, and license type. To distinguish between domestic and foreign-controlled daughter banks, we introduce an additional dummy variable that identifies foreign-controlled banks.
Finally, to control for expected changes in deposits unassociated with deposit-insurance implementation, we also add a set of 34 monthly dummies-one for each month in our sample period. These dummy variables allow us to account not only for the changes in the macroeconomic environment, such as increases in the household income, economy growth, and inflation, but also for the seasonality of deposits.
To test the moral hazard hypothesis (H3), we run two separate sets of regressions using the bank-equity ratio and the bank-loan ratio as dependent variables that proxy for bank financial risk and bank operating risk-taking.
We investigate how the introduction of the DIS affects banks' deposit-taking by employing random-effects estimation. The random-effects model allows us to estimate the effects of time-invariant bank characteristics-such as ownership type, license type, legal form, and location. As described in the data section, our panel is unbalanced and consists of 26,076 bank-month observations. For in-depth analysis, we also split the study sample by four DIS-introduction sub-periods defined in Appendix 1, and run separate regressions.
Results

Univariate comparisons
In Table 3 , we document the differences in deposit levels between insured and noninsured banks across four periods of deposit-insurance introduction, which are described in Appendix 1. Within each period, we average across bank-month observations. In the pre-DIS implementation period, all banks are non-insured.
During the first stage of DIS implementation, the banks gradually enter the DI systemsome banks enter the system later than others because of the time-consuming CBR examination procedures. During this period, membership is a positive signal while non-membership is not a negative signal yet.
In the following period, (stages 2 and 3 by the DI law), a bank that was initially rejected has a right to appeal and can be accepted if it addressed the CBR criticism that caused rejection in the Stage 1. At this stage, the non-membership is a negative signal, as the bank was initially rejected by the CBR. By the end of DIS introduction, each bank's quality has been completely revealed to the public by its ultimate acceptance or rejection by the CBR.
In Panel A of Table 3 , we look at the level of deposits in millions of rubles. We focus our discussion on the medians rather than the means because of the disproportionate impact of Sberbank. In the pre-DIS implementation period, the median level of deposits is 120, and rises to 135 in the first stage, 161 in the second and third stages, and peaks at 204 in the postimplementation period. During the first stage of DIS implementation, we see the difference between insured and uninsured banks emerge, with the median of the former at 241 and the median of the latter at 91. In the second and third stages of DIS implementation, the median of insured banks is 212 while the median for uninsured banks is 37. Finally, after DIS implementation, the median for insured banks peaks at 267, while the median for uninsured banks falls to 4, indicating a near total withdrawal from the market for retail deposits. At each stage, the difference in medians is statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level. In general, the numbers reveal that, in each subsequent stage of the DIS implementation, the overall growth of deposit in Russia is accompanied with the gradual redistribution of retail deposits within the banking system from non-insured to insured banks.
In Panel B of Table 3 , we look at the ratio of retail deposits to total assets. In the pre-DIS implementation period, the median ratio of retail deposits to total assets is 0.18. This ratio rises to 0.182 in the first period, to 0.189 in the second and third periods, and peaks at 0.191 in the post-implementation period. During the first stage of DIS implementation, we again see the difference between insured and uninsured banks emerge, with the median of the former at 0.28 and the median at the latter at only 0.14. In the second and third stages of DIS implementation, the median of insured banks is 0.23 while the median for uninsured bank falls to only 0.06.
Finally, after DIS implementation, the median for insured banks is 0.22, while the median for uninsured banks falls even farther to 0.01, again indicating a near total withdrawal from the market for retail deposits. 12 At each stage, the difference in medians again is statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level.
In general, the results in Panel B of Table 3 for both the level of retail deposits and the ratio of retail deposits to total assets are broadly supportive of our hypothesis that the level of deposits and ratio of deposits to assets will increase at banks accepted into the DIS but will fall at banks rejected from the DIS. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the evolution of the level of retail deposits and the ratio of retail deposits to assets in the subsample of the State-controlled banks. As described earlier (Panel B (1) assets grew faster than retail deposits (see Table 1 ) and banks have to rely on other sources of financing; and (2) consumption boom in Russia.
RUB1,136 million, which is comparable to the median size of private banks' assets for the same period.
In the pre-DIS regime, the State-controlled banks enjoyed full government guarantees on their household deposits. The exclusive deposit insurance for this group of banks was granted by the provisions of the old Civil Code (article 840). During the DIS introduction, these guarantees were revoked, as the State-controlled banks had to enter the system on the common rules. The descriptive statistics in Table 4 provides mixed results. On the one hand, there is no evidence of the consistent decline in the household deposits for the State-controlled banks, as measured by either the levels of deposits or the ratio of deposits to assets. On the other hand, there is a distinct downward trend in Sberbank's ratio of deposits to assets. Because this bank accounts for a very large share of the country's household deposits, the decline in Sberbank's deposit-to-asset ratio results in a gradual decline in the overall market share of state-controlled banks. This declining trend in Sberbank market share also is evident in Figure 1 .
One possible explanation for the observed gradual decline of Sberbank's deposit-to-asset ratio during the sample period is changes in this bank's deposit policy in response to the DIS introduction. As described in the background section, the DIS insurance premium is flat and mandatory in Russia. Therefore, the DIS imposed new costs for a State-controlled bank, especially for a bank with a very high deposit-to-assets ratio (in the case of Sberbank, above 95 th percentile) and a huge deposit portfolio. 
Random-effects regression analysis
In Tables 5 through 8 , we present the results from our random-effects regressions analyzing the level of deposits and the ratio of retail deposits to total assets, respectively. We present the results of five regressions for each dependent variable: results for the full period, for the pre-DIS period, for the first stage of the DIS period, for the second and third stages of the DIS period and for the post-DIS period. In each regression, we measure each bank's depositinsurance status by the (natural logarithm of) the number of days that the bank has been in the deposit-insurance system, for which we expect a positive and significant coefficient.
We include a series of control variables. We include firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. We include dummies for a regional bank (as opposed to a Moscow bank), for a general banking license (as opposed to a restricted banking license) and for an open joint-stock company (as opposed to closed joint-stock or private company). We include month dummies to control for macro-economic and seasonality effects.
We also include two interaction terms, interacting the number of days that the bank has been in the deposit insurance system with bank size and with the dummy indicating regional banks. We expect that smaller banks and regional banks disproportionately benefited from implementation of the DIS so that the coefficient on the first interaction term should be negative and on the second term should be positive.
Finally, in Tables 7 and 8 , we control for bank risk-taking behavior by including two additional explanatory variables: financing risk (measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets) and operating risk (measured by the ratio of total loans to assets).
In Table 5 are our results for the natural logarithm of retail deposits. Our primary variables of interest are the length of deposit insurance coverage and the two interactions of that variable with firm size and with the dummy for regional banks. We find that the length of deposit-insurance coverage is positive and statistically significant, strongly supportive of our primary hypothesis. The interaction with regional banks also is positive and statistically significant, indicating that this effect is more important for regional banks than for Moscow banks and for small banks (as revealed by the coefficients on the two interaction terms).
In Table 6 are our results for the ratio of retail deposits to total assets. Again, our primary variables of interest are the length of deposit-insurance coverage and the two interactions of that variable with firm size and with the dummy for regional banks. We find that the length of deposit-insurance coverage is positive and statistically significant, strongly supportive of our primary hypothesis. The interaction with regional banks also is positive and statistically significant, indicating that this effect is more important for regional banks than for Moscow banks and for small banks (as revealed by the coefficients on the two interaction terms).
To address our hypothesis on the decrease of deposits in State-controlled banks in response to the DIS introduction, we include interaction of State-controlled bank indicator variable with the logarithm of days in DIS in all multivariate tests. Overall, the results in Tables   -22 - 5 and 6 provide weak support for our expectation that the DIS implementation in private banks leads to the reduction of deposits in State-controlled banks. Although the estimated coefficient is negative at some stages of DIS introduction, it is insignificant. One possible explanation for this result is that the adjustment of the State-controlled banks to a new deposit market regime in which State banks have to pay insurance premiums and to compete with private banks is a slow process. As of the end of 2006, the overall consistent decline in the share of State-controlled banks in the Russian deposit market was driven by the declines at Sberbank.
Finally, we control for bank risk-taking behavior. These results are reported in Tables 7   and 8 , and are consistent with our main results in Tables 5 and 6 .
Does deposit insurance create incentives for greater risk-taking?
Thus far, we have examined the "bright side" of deposit insurance; we now turn to the "dark side" of deposit insurance: moral hazard induced by incentives for greater bank risktaking. We examine two alternative paths by which banks could increase risk-financial risk as measured by the ratio of bank equity to assets and operating risk as measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets. We examine the dark side both graphically in Figure 2 and statistically in Tables   9 and 10 .
First, we graph the ratio of bank equity to assets-our inverse measure of financial riskand the ratio of bank loans to assets-our measure of operating risk, in Panels B and C, respectively of Figure 2 . We plot the median ratios for all banks and separately for banks accepted in Stage 1 of the DIS and for banks accepted in Stages 2 or 3 of the DIS.
In Panel B of Figure 2 , we see that banks accepted in Stage 1 had lower-than-average capital ratios, whereas banks accepted in Stages 2 or 3 had higher-than-average capital ratios.
More interesting is the time-series behavior of the Stage 2/3 banks' capital ratio, which rises, but then falls, by the end of the period, to almost the same level as that of Stage 1 banks. This suggests that these banks boosted their capital ratios in order to improve their chances of Stage 2/3 acceptance, but then increased their financial risk after acceptance-consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis. Stage 1 banks also increased their financial risk after acceptance, as evidenced by the decline in their ratio of equity to asset-also consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis.
In Panel C of Figure 2 , we see that banks accepted in Stage 1 had higher-than-median operating risk as measured by the loan-to-asset ratio, whereas banks accepted in Stage 2/3 had lower-than-median operating risk. Stage 2/3 banks rapidly increased their operating risk during the Stage 1 period prior to their acceptance into the DIS, which is inconsistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. After a slight increase at the beginning of the Stage 1 period, the loan-to-asset ratio of Stage 1 banks is relatively stable-also inconsistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis.
Together, Panels B and C of Figure 2 provide at least some evidence in favor of the moral-hazard hypothesis in the form of increased financial risk as evidenced by declining capital ratios, but not in the form of increased operating risk as measured by the loan-to-asset ratio.
Next, we look at more rigorous econometric evidence on the moral-hazard issue.
In Table 9 , we analyze the ratio of bank equity to assets using the same set of explanatory variables used to examine the deposit-to-asset ratio. Our primary variable of interest is the log of days in the DIS. If banks increased their financial risk, then we would expect a negative and significant coefficient on this explanatory variable. Moreover, we would expect that the coefficient on this variable would decrease (increase in magnitude) as we move through the stages of implementation. As shown in the first row of Figure 2 .
In Table 10 , we analyze the ratio of bank loans to assets using the same set of explanatory variables used to examine the equity-to-asset ratio and the deposit-to-asset ratio. Again, our primary variable of interest is the log of days in the DIS. If banks increased their operating risk, then we would expect a positive and significant coefficient on this explanatory variable.
Moreover, we would expect that the coefficient on this variable would increase as we move through the stages of implementation. As shown in the first row of Table 10, 
Evaluation of the "costs" and "benefits" of deposit insurance
One way to evaluate the relative "costs" and "benefits" from implementation of deposit insurance is to evaluate the standardized marginal effects of our DIS variable. This essentially involves comparisons of standardized regression coefficients. To facilitate the robust comparison -25 -of the relative impact of the DIS introduction on banks' deposit-taking versus risk-taking incentives, we transform our main dependent variables (deposit ratio to capture benefits; equity ratio and loan ratio to capture risk-taking) and the set of the explanatory variables so that each standardized variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1; we then rerun the panel regressions. The obtained standardized coefficient estimates for the basic model specification reveal the following effects.
For the whole sample period, if we increase an average bank's length of membership in the DIS, measured as Ln (Days in DIS +1), by one standard deviation, then the loans to asset ratio will result in only 0.10 standard deviation increase, the predicted equity ratio will decrease by 0.49 standard deviations, while the deposit ratio will increase by 0.37 standard deviations.
Thus, in terms of standard units, the length of the DIS membership has the strongest relative effect on the decrease of the capital ratio and somewhat weaker, but pronounced positive, effect on the deposit ratio. The effect on the loan ratio is relatively small. Overall, it appears that the magnitudes of the Ln (Days in DIS + 1) coefficients in the model specifications with standardized equity and deposit ratios as dependent variables are not very different. It suggests comparable economic importance of positive and negative effects of DIS.
Clearly, a reasonable limitation applies. What is "stronger" -a 0.49 decrease in the equity to assets ratio or a 0.37 increase in the deposit to assets ratio if we think of it in real (practical) terms? Should 0.10 standard deviation increase in the loan-to-asset ratio add to the "negativity" of DIS intro? In addition, there can be a number of other positive and negative influences on the balance of costs and benefits that we do not address in the study and, thus, do not even attempt to measure.
-26 -
Robustness checks
For the robustness check, we perform the following empirical tests. First, we use an alternative measure for the DIS acceptance. We replace the log of the number of days in DIS by a zero-one indicator variable that is equal to zero for observations occurring before a bank acceptance into deposit insurance and to one for observations occurring after the acceptance.
The results remain unchanged. Second, we exclude Sberbank from the analyses. This also does not affect our results. Third, we exclude banks that were liquidated during the sample period.
All results are qualitatively similar to the main results in Tables 5 and 6 . Finally, we account for the fact that, in the last period, after the DIS implementation, the non-insured banks lost the privilege to attract new deposits. To answer the question if there is any value of getting deposit insurance early, we run additional regression for the last sub-period for a subsample of insured banks only. The results are very similar to estimation results for Model 5 in Tables 5 and 6 .
Conclusions
In this study, we use a natural experiment to provide new evidence on the benefits to depositors and banks from implementation of a system for insuring deposits. In 2004, Russia implemented a new system for insuring the funds of depositors. We test whether implementation of this system benefited depositors and banks in the form of increased deposit-taking and reduced reliance upon State-owned banks. We also test whether implementation of this system resulted in moral hazard in the form of increased risk-taking.
We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increased both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that did not enter the new deposit-insurance system. We find that these results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank and time random effects in addition to a number of control variables. We also find that the longer a bank was entered into the deposit-insurance system, the greater was both its level of retail deposits and its ratio of retail deposits to assets.
Moreover, this effect was stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks, which we expect to disproportionately benefit from the implementation of deposit insurance at the expense of their
Moscow-based and larger rivals.
Our results regarding State-owned banks are less straightforward. We find that deposits and the ratio of deposits to assets declined at State-owned banks following introduction of deposit insurance. However, this result was driven entirely by declines at Sberbank, which dominates the market, and there are competitive reasons why Sberbank may have voluntarily chosen to reduce its retail deposits in response to the new deposit insurance premiums. Even so, this result suggests that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system had the effect of "leveling the playing field" between State-owned banks and privately owned banks.
Finally, we find strong evidence that implementation of deposit insurance increased moral hazard in the form of increased risk-taking. We find that financial risk, as measured by the ratio of bank equity to assets, increased significantly, i.e., the ratio equity to assets declined, following implementation. We also find limited evidence that operating risk, as measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets, increased, i.e., the ratio of loans to assets increased, following implementation. Together with our results regarding retail deposits, these results are supportive of both a dark side and a bright side of deposit insurance.
Appendix 1
Timeline for the Introduction of a Deposit Insurance System in Russia. (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Period
Table 6
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the deposit ratio of Russian banks. (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Table 9
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the capital ratio of Russian banks. (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Table 10
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the loan-to-asset ratio of Russian banks. (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
